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I. INTRODUCTION
The pharmaceutical industry has long been an enforcement headache for the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA). In particular, the FDA has struggled with
enforcing the laws restricting the promotion of drugs. Off-label promotion, or the
promotion of FDA-approved drugs for unapproved uses, is generally prohibited.'
Nevertheless, pharmaceutical manufacturers have risked the health and safety of
patients by promoting their drugs for uses that have been explicitly rejected by the
FDA as well as uses that were never presented to the FDA for approval.2 Because
these illegal promotional activities were largely aimed at doctors, the FDA had
difficulty detecting the violations and often relied on whistle blowers to alert the
agency to the misconduct. Once the violations were detected, however, the FDA
was presented with an enforcement dilemma.
The FDA pursued a strategy of cooperative enforcement with pharmaceutical
companies to avoid the collateral consequences of criminal conviction. If a
pharmaceutical company is convicted of a felony, it would be automatically
excluded from participation in federal health care programs, such as Medicare and
Medicaid, for a period of at least five years. Exclusion has been described as a
"death sentence" 4  for pharmaceutical manufacturers because it prevents the
federal government from reimbursing patients for any drug produced by the
1. The dissemination of truthful off-label information through scientific journals is permitted. U.S. Dep't of
Health and Human Serv., Guidance for Industry, Good Reprint Practices for the Distribution of Medical Journal
Articles and Medical or Scientific Reference Publications on Unapproved New Uses of Approved Drugs and
Approved or Cleared Medical Devices, at III, V (2009), available at http://www.fda.gov/RegulatoryInformation/
Guidances/ucml25126.htm. There is no specific statutory prohibition on the promotion or marketing of FDA-
approved drugs for unapproved uses (off-label promotion). The FDA has interpreted the Food Drug and Cosmetic
Act (FDCA), however, to prohibit such off-label promotion. Under the FDCA, a pharmaceutical manufacturer
must provide scientific evidence to demonstrate that a drug is safe and effective for a particular use before the
manufacturer may introduce the drug into interstate commerce. 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (2012). The approved uses
are included on the FDA-approved label. A drug is considered to be criminally misbranded under the FDCA if it
does not bear adequate directions for its intended use. 21 U.S.C. §§ 331, 352(f) (2012). If a pharmaceutical
manufacturer promotes a drug for off-label uses, the FDA considers that to be a misbranding violation because the
off-label promotion is evidence that the manufacturer is putting forth an intended use for the drug for which there
are no directions on the FDA-approved label. This theory recently ran into some difficulty in United States v.
Caronia, 703 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2012), where the Second Circuit narrowly interpreted the FDCA's misbranding
provision as not "criminaliz[ing] the simple promotion of a drug's off-label use" because such an interpretation
would run afoul of the First Amendment's protection of commercial speech. Id. at 162. The Caronia case,
however, dealt with truthful off-label promotion. False off-label promotion, like that at issue in this Article, is not
protected by the First Amendment.
2. See generally Katrice Bridges Copeland, Enforcing Integrity, 87 IND. L.J. 1033 (2012) (describing,
inter alia, Pfizer's promotion of its drug Bextra for postsurgical pain despite the FDA's finding that it was not safe
for that use).
3. See infra Part III.A.
4. See Vicki W. Girard, Punishing Pharmaceutical Companies for Unlawful Promotion of Approved Drugs:
Why the False Claims Act is the Wrong Rx, 12 J. HEALTH CARE L. & Pot'Y 119, 137 (2009) (citing Christopher D.
Zalesky, Pharmaceutical Marketing Practices: Balancing Public Health and Law Enforcement Interests; Moving
Beyond Regulation-Through-Litigation, 39 J. HEALTH L. 235, 241 & n.27 (2006)).
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excluded pharmaceutical manufacturer. Thus, Medicare and Medicaid patients
who have prescriptions for drugs produced by the excluded pharmaceutical
company would have to pay for their drugs out of pocket or have their doctors
prescribe a similar drug by a non-excluded pharmaceutical manufacturer. To avoid
the potentially devastating consequences of exclusion on patients, the FDA opted
not to pursue felony criminal charges against pharmaceutical manufacturers that
engaged in off-label promotion. Instead, the FDA entered into Corporate Integrity
Agreements that required the pharmaceutical companies to pay large fines and
enact compliance measures designed to prevent the illegal promotional activity
from recurring.5 In return, the government agreed not to pursue felony criminal
charges or debar the pharmaceutical manufacturers from participation in federal
health care programs.6
The FDA's approach seemed like a reasonable response to a complicated
enforcement problem. For several years, there was a steady stream of Corporate
Integrity Agreements with eye-popping fines as high as $3 billion and increasingly
strict compliance measures.7 The harsh reality, however, was that pharmaceutical
companies viewed the fines and compliance measures as nothing more than the
cost of doing business. The profits to be gained from illegal promotion far
exceeded the cost of the fines and compliance measures.
Thus, the Corporate Integrity Agreements were not enough to deter pharmaceu-
tical companies from engaging in fraudulent promotional activity.8 As a result, the
FDA began to see repeat offenders of the pharmaceutical marketing rules. Even
when faced with a repeat offender, however, the FDA simply entered into a new
Corporate Integrity Agreement, imposed a larger fine and harsher compliance
measures, and either allowed the pharmaceutical company to designate a subsid-
iary to be criminally charged and debarred or charged the manufacturer with a
5. See generally Copeland, supra note 2 (explaining the reasons that the government entered into Corporate
Integrity Agreements rather than pursuing exclusion and the most common requirements of those agreements).
6. See id.
7. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, GlaxoSmith Kline to Plead Guilty and Pay $3 Billion to
Resolve Fraud Allegations and Failure to Report Safety Data (July 2, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/
opa/pr/2012/July/12-civ-842.htmI (announcing fine and Corporate Integrity Agreement with GlaxoSmithKline
that requires the company to change the way that its sales force is compensated); Press Release, U.S. Dep't of
Health and Human Servs., Justice Department Announces Largest Health Care Fraud Settlement in Its History:
Pfizer to Pay $2.3 Billion for Fraudulent Marketing (Sept. 2, 2009), available at http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/
2009pres/09/20090902a.html (announcing fine and Corporate Integrity Agreement with Pfizer that requires Pfizer
to adopt procedures to "avoid and promptly detect" improper marketing activities); Press Release, U.S. Dep't of
Justice, Eli Lilly and Company Agrees to Pay $1.415 Billion to Resolve Allegations of Off-Label Promotion of
Zyprexa (Jan. 9, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/January/09-civ-038.html (announcing
Corporate Integrity Agreement that requires Eli Lilly's Board of Directors to annually review Eli Lilly's
compliance program and certify its effectiveness); see also Copeland, supra note 2, at 1050-53 (explaining the
stricter compliance measures imposed over the years).
8. See generally Copeland, supra note 2, (proposing alternative enforcement mechanisms to be used in place
of Corporate Integrity Agreements).
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misdemeanor, which would not automatically lead to exclusion.9 Thus, pharmaceu-
tical manufacturers still had little incentive to change their illegal promotional
practices because the profits from off-label promotion outweighed the costs of
fines and compliance measures.
The government had unleashed every weapon in its arsenal to combat fraud, or
so the industry thought, before the FDA changed the focus of its enforcement
strategy. In a March 4, 2010 letter to Senator Charles E. Grassley, Margaret
Hamburg, the Commissioner of Food and Drugs, announced that the FDA intended
to make use of individual misdemeanor prosecutions "to hold responsible corpo-
rate officials accountable."' 0 Hamburg also made it clear that the FDA intended to
enhance and make better use of its debarment and disqualification procedures." In
addition, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) of Health and Human Services and
the Department of Justice (DOJ) both endorsed the new enforcement strategy.12
Thus, the FDA, OIG, and DOJ shifted their focus in pharmaceutical fraud cases
from simply pursuing pharmaceutical companies to pursuing misdemeanor crimi-
nal charges against individual executives. This is a welcome change because
potential criminal liability may be more likely to deter individual executives and
incentivize effective monitoring.
The FDA is not, however, focused on targeting executives for their own
misconduct. Instead, the FDA is pursuing misdemeanor criminal charges against
executives for the criminal conduct of their subordinates. To support its theory of
indirect criminal liability, the government has dusted off the responsible corporate
officer doctrine.13 The responsible corporate officer doctrine permits the gov-
ernment to prosecute an executive for a misdemeanor violation of the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act' 4 regardless of the officer's lack of awareness of
misconduct if, by reason of the officer's position in the company, she had the
responsibility and authority either (1) to prevent the misconduct in the first place,
or (2) promptly to correct the violation, but failed to do so. 15 The responsible
corporate officer doctrine comes from two Supreme Court cases, United States v.
Dotterweichl6 and United States v. Park,'7 decided in 1943 and 1974 respectively.
9. Id. at 1055-64.
10. Letter from Margaret A. Hamburg, M.D., Comm'r, FDA to Charles E. Grassley, Ranking Member, Senate
Comm. on Fin. (Mar. 4, 2010).
11. Id.
12. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Former Drug Company Executive Pleads Guilty in
Oversized Drug Tablets Case (Mar. 10, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/201 I/March/I -civ-
306.html (quoting Tony West, Assistant Attorney General for the DOJ's Civil Division, as saying "[w]e will hold
corporate executives responsible when company profits are pursued at the expense of consumer safety").
13. The doctrine is also known as the responsible relation doctrine or the Park doctrine. See United States v.
Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1974).
14. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (2012).
15. See Park, 421 U.S. at 673-74.
16. 320 U.S. 277 (1943).
17. 421 U.S. 658 (1974).
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The responsible corporate officer doctrine "dispenses with the conventional
requirement for criminal conduct-awareness of some wrongdoing."' 8 Thus, the
burden of complying with the law is placed on "a person otherwise innocent but
standing in responsible relation to a public danger."' 9 The government has already
successfully obtained guilty pleas to misdemeanor violations of the Food Drug and
Cosmetic Act 20 based on the responsible corporate officer doctrine.
Many scholars have debated the fairness of criminal misdemeanor convictions
based on the responsible corporate officer doctrine. 2 ' But the misdemeanor
convictions are not the end of the story. Just as there are collateral consequences
that flow from convicting pharmaceutical manufacturers, there are collateral
consequences for executives as well. This Article fills a critical gap in the literature
concerning the collateral consequences of a criminal conviction under the respon-
sible corporate officer doctrine. Following criminal conviction, the OIG has the
discretion to exclude executives from participation in federal health care pro-
grams.2 2 The exclusion is not mandatory upon misdemeanor conviction and is
considered to be a civil remedy.2 3 The baseline period of exclusion is three years
but can be increased based on aggravating factors. The OIG has sent executives
notice that they have been excluded from participation in federal health care
programs for periods as long as twenty years.24 For an individual, exclusion means
that the executive is no longer employable in the health care industry because any
company that directly or indirectly receives money from federal health care
programs cannot employ an excluded individual without jeopardizing its own
participation in those programs.2 5 As pharmaceutical companies often rely heavily
on millions of dollars in revenue from Medicare and Medicaid reimbursements for
their drugs, hiring a debarred executive could be akin to a death sentence for the
company. Thus, the collateral consequence of the misdemeanor conviction is to
take away the executive's livelihood.
Health care executives who potentially make millions of dollars are probably
not the most sympathetic defendants. While they were in charge their companies
violated the law and once charged they have ample access to resources for their
18. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 280-81, quoted in Park, 421 U.S. at 668-69.
19. Id.
20. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (2012).
21. See Norman Abrams, Criminal Liability of Corporate Officers for Strict Liability Offenses-A Comment on
Dotterweich and Park, 28 UCLA L. REV. 463, 471 (1980-1981); Michael E. Clark, The Responsible Corporate
Officer Doctrine A Re-Emergent Threat to General Counsel and Corporate Officers, 14 J. HEALTH CARE
COMPLIANCE 5, 11 (2012); Martin Petrin, Circumscribing the "Prosecutor's Ticket to Tag the Elite"-A Critique of
the Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine, 84 TEMP. L. REv. 283, 292 (2012); Kathleen M. Boozang,
Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine: When is Falling Down on the Job a Crime?, 6 ST. Louis U. J. HEALTH
L. & Pot'Y 77 (2012).
22. See infra Part III.A.
23. See infra Part III.A.
24. See infra Part III.B.
25. See infra Part III.A.
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defense. Nevertheless, the imposition of debarment for a significant period of time
without any showing of moral blameworthiness should give anyone pause. The
violations at issue are strict liability misdemeanors, which do not require a
showing of intent and are punishable by less than a year in jail.26 Through
exclusion, the government is effectively transforming a strict liability misde-
meanor violation that is not based on the executive's own misconduct into a felony.
Exclusion is not meant to be punitive. The goal is supposed to be to protect the
health care system from unscrupulous individuals.27 Absent a showing of moral
blameworthiness on the part of health care executives who were in charge at the
time the misconduct occurred, a period of exclusion longer than the three-year
base level for permissive exclusions is a grossly disproportionate remedy. It is not
enough to say that a showing of moral blameworthiness is unnecessary because
exclusion is categorized as a civil sanction where, as here, the civil sanction is
clearly more devastating than the criminal penalty attached to the misdemeanor
conviction.
This Article argues that the government's exclusion of executives who have
been convicted as "responsible corporate officers" for a period longer than three
years without any showing of moral blameworthiness is misguided. The respon-
sible corporate officer doctrine is flawed because under the doctrine it is irrelevant
that the executive did not intend for the misconduct to occur. It is not a defense that
the executive delegated responsibility in good faith. Nor is it a defense that the
executive is not knowledgeable about or did not participate in the misconduct. The
only potential defense is impossibility, but it has never been used successfully.
Even if those shortcomings in the responsible corporate officer doctrine were
overlooked due to the fact that it is a misdemeanor charge, the piling on of long
periods of exclusion significantly raises the stakes for the executives. Part II of this
Article sets forth the foundation for and justification of the responsible corporate
officer doctrine. It also scrutinizes the shortcomings of the responsible corporate
officer doctrine. Part III of this Article examines the collateral consequences of
conviction as a responsible corporate officer. It uses the exclusion of Purdue
Pharma executives as a case study to examine the justification for and problems
with excluding executives who had no knowledge of wrongdoing. It argues that
the collateral consequence of conviction-exclusion-is more devastating than
the criminal sentence that an executive would face upon conviction. Part IV argues
that a conviction as a responsible corporate officer does not demonstrate that the
executive is morally blameworthy for the actions of subordinates. Further, it
argues that despite the fact that exclusion is technically a civil remedy, it should be
treated as a de facto criminal penalty in this context where it is the most serious
26. See infra Section 11.
27. 67 Fed. Reg. 11,928, 11,928 (Mar. 18, 2002) (explaining that exclusion is meant to protect federal health
care programs from "untrustworthy health care providers").
804 [Vol. 51:799
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consequence that responsible corporate officers face as a result of conviction. This
Article concludes that the collateral consequences of holding "responsible corpo-
rate officers" criminally accountable for the misconduct of their subordinates are
disproportionate to the crime of conviction and should not be imposed for longer
than three years absent a showing of moral blameworthiness.
II. BACKGROUND
The Food and Drug Administration regulates the pharmaceutical industry
through the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA)." Violations of the FDCA are
considered to be public welfare offenses. Public welfare offenses are a special
category of regulatory offenses that involve dangerous activities or materials. The
Supreme Court has explained that these are crimes relating to activities that "a
reasonable person should know is subject to stringent public regulation and may
seriously threaten the community's health or safety."2 9 Because a reasonable
person should be aware of the risks involved with activities proscribed by public
welfare offenses, these crimes are an exception to the fundamental requirement
that individuals should not be punished unless the government can demonstrate
wrongful conduct along with a guilty mind.3 0 The Supreme Court has upheld the
constitutionality of public welfare offenses that punish conduct in the absence of a
mens rea requirement. Although considered dicta, one important factor for the
Court in permitting punishment for a crime without a mens rea element was the
relatively light punishment that an individual will receive for violating a public
welfare offense.
The responsible corporate officer doctrine, which holds executives criminally
responsible for the misconduct of subordinates, has only been applied to public
welfare offenses. Ordinarily, it is considered to be "morally objectionable" to hold
someone criminally responsible for the conduct of others "because it ignores the
separateness of each person as a responsible autonomous agent." 3 2 Thus, this
Section critically examines the doctrinal foundation for the responsible corporate
officer doctrine and the normative theories justifying it to determine if the moral
objection can be overcome.
28. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (2012).
29. Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 433 (1985).
30. Id.
31. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 256 (1952) (explaining that "penalties commonly are relatively
small, and conviction does no grave damage to an offender's reputation"); cf Staples v. United States, 511 U.S.
600, 616 (1994) (holding that a gun regulation was not subject to public welfare doctrine in part because
"the small penalties attached to [public welfare] offenses logically complement[] the absence of a mens rea
requirement").
32. Dennis J. Baker, The Moral Limits of Criminalizing Remote Harms, 10 NEW CiuM. L. REv. 370, 370,
372-73 (2007) (arguing that a person "should only be held responsible for another's criminal harm when she is
normatively involved in it").
8052014]
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A. Foundation of Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine
The responsible corporate officer doctrine only applies to public welfare
offenses. The doctrine grew from two Supreme Court cases dealing with violations
of the FDCA.
In United States v. Dotterweich," the government charged Buffalo Pharmacal
Company, Inc. and Joseph H. Dotterweich, the president and general manager of
Buffalo Pharmacal Company, with violating the FDCA by shipping misbranded
and adulterated drugs in interstate commerce. 34 Buffalo Pharmacal Company
purchased drugs from a wholesale manufacturer, repackaged them, and then
shipped them to physicians who made mail orders. The drug shipments were
alleged to be misbranded and adulterated because the labels placed on the drugs
during repackaging misrepresented the ingredients and/or potency of the drugs.36
Dotterweich was not personally involved in repackaging or shipping the drugs.
The jury convicted Dotterweich but not Buffalo Pharmacal Company.37 On appeal,
the Second Circuit reversed Dotterweich's conviction. The appellate court found
that the prohibition on shipping misbranded and adulterated drugs applied to the
drug dealer (Buffalo Pharmacal Company), not an agent (Dotterweich), unless the
"individual operated a corporation as his 'alter ego' or agent."39 The court found
that there was no evidence to support such a theory in this case.40
The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit, finding that the FDCA "was
designed to enlarge and stiffen the penal net and not to narrow and loosen it."4 '
Thus, the Court found the appellate court's construction of the FDCA too limiting
and in contravention of the FDCA's purpose to protect the "innocent public."4 2 The
Court found that Dotterweich was liable under the Act because he had a "re-
sponsible share" in the shipment of the misbranded and adulterated drugs despite
the fact he did not have "consciousness of wrongdoing."43 In the Court's view,
Dotterweich, as an executive in the company, was in a better position than the
public to ensure that the drugs that were shipped in interstate commerce met the
requirements of the consumer protection laws. As such, he had to bear the risk of
33. 320 U.S. 277 (1943).
34. Id. at 278.
35. United States v. Buffalo Pharmacal Co., Inc., 131 F.2d 500, 501 (2d Cir. 1942), rev'd sub nom. United
States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943).
36. Id. at 501-02 (explaining that the first charge was based on an interstate shipment of cascara compound
which was labeled as Hinkle pills but contained an ingredient not found in Hinkle pills and the second charge was
based on interstate shipment of digitalis tablets which were labeled as containing potency of one U.S.P. unit of
digitalis but actually contained less than half of that).
37. Id. at 501.
38. Id. at 503.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 282 (1943).
42. Id. at 285.
43. Id. at 284.
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those laws being violated, not the public." The Court declined to specify which
group of employees stands in "responsible relation," describing any attempt to do
so as "treacherous." 4 5 Instead, the Court explained that these decisions would have
to be made by relying on and trusting "the good sense of prosecutors, the wise
guidance of trial judges, and the ultimate judgment of juries."4 6
Over three decades later, the Supreme Court decided United States v. Park,
which reaffirmed the responsible corporate officer doctrine. In Park, the govern-
ment charged Acme Markets, Inc. (Acme) and John R. Park, Acme's chief
executive officer, with violating the FDCA by causing adulteration of food which
had travelled in interstate commerce and which was held for sale in Acme's
Baltimore warehouse. 4 8 The information alleged that rodents contaminated the
food in the Baltimore warehouse.49 Acme pleaded guilty to all five counts in the
information, but Park pleaded not guilty and went to trial.5 o The evidence at trial
showed that an FDA inspector examined Acme's Baltimore warehouse and found
evidence of rodent infestation of food in November and December of 1971 and
again in March of 1972."' On January 27, 1972, the FDA's Chief of Compliance
for the Baltimore office sent a letter to Park detailing the sanitary violations at the
Baltimore warehouse.52 Acme's Baltimore division vice president responded to
the letter and explained the steps Acme was taking to remedy the violations. In
the March 1972 inspection, the FDA inspector noted that there was some
improvement in the sanitary conditions, but that there was still rodent activity in
the warehouse.54 Park testified at trial that all Acme employees were under his
general control, but the specific job of sanitation was handled by somebody else in
the Acme organizational structure. 5 He explained that after receiving the January
1972 letter from the FDA, he conferred with the vice president for legal affairs
who told him that the problem was being investigated and handled by the
Baltimore division vice president. 6 Park stated that he did not think that there was
anything else that he could have done that was not already being done by the
Baltimore division vice president.57 On cross-examination, Park admitted that
there was a prior problem with sanitation at the Philadelphia warehouse and that
44. Id. at 284-85.
45. Id. at 285.
46. Id.
47. 421 U.S. 658 (1975).
48. Id. at 660.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 660-61.
51. Id. at 661-62.
52. Id. at 662-63, n.3.
53. Id. at 662.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 663.
56. Id. at 663-64.
57. Id. at 664.
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one individual had responsibility for the sanitation of both the Philadelphia and
Baltimore warehouses." He further acknowledged that the sanitation problem at
Baltimore meant that the system for dealing with sanitation "wasn't working
perfectly" and that he was ultimately responsible for the sanitation problem59 The
jury found Park guilty on all five counts of the information and fined him $250.60
On appeal, Park argued that the district court's jury instructions were erroneous
and that evidence of the sanitation problems at the Philadelphia warehouse should
not have been admitted at trial.6 ' The district court instructed the jury that in order
to find Park guilty they must find beyond a reasonable doubt each element of the
offense. The district court also told the jury that "you need not concern yourselves
with the first two elements of the case. The main issue for your determination is
only with the third element, whether the Defendant held a position of authority and
responsibility in the business of Acme Markets."6 2 Further, the judge explained
that it was not necessary that the jury find that Park consciously did wrong or that
he "personally participated in the situation" so long as they found that Park "had a
responsible relationship to the issue" due to his position of authority in the
company.63 The Fourth Circuit found that the instructions could have left the jury
with the false impression that they could convict Park without any showing that he
engaged in "wrongful action."" In particular, the court was concerned that those
jury instructions permitted a conviction based only on the fact that Park was the
president of Acme.65 The Fourth Circuit explained that Dotterweich dispensed
with the need to prove "awareness of wrongdoing" but did not relieve the
prosecutor of the burden to prove "wrongful action" on the part of the defendant.66
Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit reversed Park's conviction and remanded the case
to the district court for a new trial.
The Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit's ruling and reinstated Park's
conviction.6 8 The Supreme Court found that the district court was not required to
instruct the jury about the government's burden to prove "wrongful action."6 9 The
Court explained that the government makes a prima facie case by demonstrating
that "the defendant had, by reason of his position in the corporation, responsibility
and authority either to prevent in the first instance, or promptly to correct, the
58. Id. at 664-65.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 666.
61. United States v. Park, 499 F.2d 839, 840 (4th Cir. 1974), rev'd, 421 U.S. 658 (1975).
62. Park, 421 U.S. at 665 n.9.
63. Id.
64. Park, 499 F.2d at 841-42 (internal quotation marks omitted).
65. See id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 843.
68. Park, 421 U.S. at 667.
69. Id. at 673.
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violation complained of, and that he failed to do so."7 0 In the Court's view the
defendant's authority coupled with the requirements of the FDCA supplied the
causal link needed for liability." The Court also noted that "[t]he concept of a
'responsible relationship' to, or a 'responsible share' in, a violation of the Act
indeed imports some measure of blameworthiness."72 Further, the Court found that
the admission of evidence regarding the Philadelphia warehouse sanitation prob-
lem was appropriate to demonstrate that Park had reason to suspect that his
subordinates were not dependable and that he needed to do something more to
insure compliance with the FDCA.7 ' Finally, the Court recognized that there is a
defense to liability when it would have been "objectively impossible" for the
executive to prevent or correct the misconduct.7 4
In the twenty years following the Park decision, the overwhelming majority
of responsible corporate officer prosecutions were based on violations of environ-
mental laws rather than the FDCA." The defendants in those environmental cases
were rarely successful at challenging their responsible corporate officer con-
victions.76 There is one important diffetence, however, between the environmental
cases and the FDCA cases. Many of the environmental statutes include "respon-
sible corporate officer" in their definition of a "person" who could violate the
statute. There is no such definition in the FDCA. Thus, there is a stronger
statutory ground for bringing the responsible corporate officer prosecutions under
the environmental laws than there is under the FDCA.
In the few cases that did involve the FDCA, the defendants unsuccessfully
raised the impossibility defense. In United States v. y Hata & Co.,78 the defendant
owned a multi-food storage warehouse in Hawaii. The FDA inspected the facility
70. Id. at 673-74.
71. Id. at 674.
72. Id. at 673.
73. Id. at 677-78.
74. Id. at 673.
75. See United States v. Hansen, 262 F.3d 1217 (11th Cir. 2001); United States v. Iverson, 162 F.3d 1015
(9th Cir. 1998); United States v. MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co., 933 F.2d 35 (1st Cir. 1991); United States v.
Brittain, 931 F.2d 1413 (10th Cir. 1991); United States v. White, 766 F. Supp. 873 (E.D. Wash. 1991); People v.
Matthews, 7 Cal. App. 4th 1052 (Ct. of App. Cal. 1992); Comm'r, Dep't. of Envir. Mgmt. v. RLG, 755 N.E.2d 556
(Ind. 2001); State Dept. of Ecology v. Lundgren, 971 P.2d 948, 951-53 (Wash. App. 1999).
76. The highest likelihood of success in environmental cases comes when the statute at issue is a felony, as
opposed to a misdemeanor, and the statute specifically requires a showing of intent. See, e.g., MacDonald &
Watson Waste Oil Co., 933 F.2d at 52-53 (holding that a defendant could not be convicted of knowingly
transporting and causing the transportation of hazardous waste to a facility without a permit based solely on the
responsible corporate officer doctrine; there must be some showing that the defendant had knowledge or was
willfully blind); White, 766 F. Supp. at 894-95 (explaining that although Dotterweich and Park do not require
actual knowledge of the violation, such knowledge must be established when the statute at issue explicitly
requires knowledge). But see Brittain, 931 F.2d at 1419 (finding that mens rea can be imputed by virtue of the
defendant's position of responsibility).
77. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(6) (2012) ("For the purpose of this subsection, the term 'person' means. . .
any responsible corporate officer.").
78. 535 F.2d 508, 509 (9th Cir. 1976).
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and discovered birds in the warehouse as well as excreta on bags of rice." The
government charged the company and its president, Minoru Hata, with violating
the FDCA. Hata argued that the district judge should have given the jury an
instruction on objective impossibility.80 The Ninth Circuit, relying on Park, upheld
the conviction. The court noted that Hata was aware of the bird infestation problem
as early as August 1971 and tried numerous devices to keep the birds out of the
warehouse and none of them were completely successful. 8 ' Finally, in the spring of
1972, Hata decided to enclose the entire food storage area in a huge wire cage to
prevent the birds from getting in the warehouse.8 2 The cage was not in place,
however, when the FDA returned for inspections in May and June of 1972. The
government argued that the impossibility defense was not available simply
because the defendant argued that the problem could not be fixed in a timely
fashion.8 4 In the government's view, they should have closed the warehouse. The
court held that the impossibility defense was not available because in accordance
with the duty of foresight and vigilance, the company should have considered and
experimented with the cage long before the FDA inspection. The implication of
the Hata decision is that the impossibility defense is not available if an individual
experiments with certain measures but fails to solve the problem.
In United States v. Starr," the government charged Cheney Food Corporation
and its secretary-treasurer, Dean Starr, with three counts of violating the FDCA
due to a mice infestation that contaminated food stored in the company's
warehouse. The FDA inspected the warehouse in the autumn of 1972 and
discovered several violations of the FDCA.88 The FDA inspector spoke with Starr,
who was in charge of sanitation, about the violations." While the FDA inspector
was still at the warehouse, Starr ordered the warehouse janitor, Marks, to correct
the situation.90 A month later, the FDA inspector came back for the second
inspection.9' Marks told the inspector that the warehouse still had a problem with
mice and that he had not taken the corrective action that Starr ordered him to take
in response to the problem.92 Starr argued that the facts supported an objective
impossibility defense because the contamination resulted from the mice fleeing a
.79. Id. at 509.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 511.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 511-12.
86. 535 F.2d 512 (9th Cir. 1976).
87. Id. at 514.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
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recently plowed nearby field which was a "natural phenomenon."9 The Ninth
Circuit again rejected this argument because it required "only a minimum of
foresight" to recognize and prepare for such a problem.9 4 Starr also argued that
Marks sabotaged the company by refusing to comply with clean-up instructions.95
In rejecting this argument, the court relied on the month-long gap between the two
inspections and the fact that Starr never checked on Mark's progress in correcting
the violations.9 6 Ultimately, the court found that "[t]he standard of 'foresight and
vigilance' encompasses a duty to anticipate and counteract the shortcomings of
delegees."" The implication of the Starr case was that delegation to a subordinate
was not an adequate justification for relieving the person in charge from liability
for the violation.
B. Philosophical Underpinnings of the Doctrine
The lower courts and scholars have struggled with identifying the foundation of
the responsible corporate officer doctrine. It is not clear from the Park and
Dotterweich decisions how the actus reus and mens rea are satisfied in each case.
In particular, the opinions do not specify whether the actus reus is satisfied based
on the personal acts and/or omissions of the responsible corporate officer or if the
actus reus is satisfied vicariously based on the acts and/or omissions of the
responsible corporate officer's subordinates. Nor is it clear whether there is any
mens rea requirement for the responsible corporate officer. If there is a mens rea
requirement, it is not evident whether negligence in failing to adequately supervise
one's subordinates would satisfy the requirement or whether a higher level of
mens rea would be needed. The difficulty lies in the fact that the underlying
offense, misdemeanor misbranding, is a strict liability crime. Strict liability crimes
dispense with the typical mens rea requirements and impose criminal liability
without regard to fault. Thus, some of the confusion concerns whether the
responsible corporate officer doctrine relieves the prosecutor of the need to prove
mens rea or whether there is no need to prove mens rea because the underlying
crime is a strict liability offense. The Supreme Court and many scholars have
conflated the issues of actus reus and mens rea in discussing the justification for
the doctrine.
Professor Norman Abrams argues that Justice Frankfurter's opinion in Dotter-
weich could be given three different interpretations. First, the opinion could be
interpreted to establish "strict, vicarious liability" for executives because the
opinion refers to executives being punished under the statute "'without any
93. Id. at 514-15.
94. Id. at 515.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 515-16.
97. Id. at 516.
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conscious fraud' or 'though consciousness of wrongdoing be totally wanting.'" 9 8
Second, the opinion could be interpreted not to resolve the question of the required
mens rea for the statute.99 Third, the opinion could be interpreted to imply a
mens rea element based on "Justice Frankfurter's characterization of those who are
guilty of the offense as 'all who do have such a responsible share in the furtherance
of the transaction."" In Professor Abrams's view, the "strict, vicarious liability"
view is the most commonly accepted view. Nevertheless, Professor Abrams seems
to be in favor of a view that requires a showing of at least negligence on the part of
the responsible corporate officer. Professor Abrams argues that the notion of a
"responsible share" shows some measure of culpability for the defendant.or
Where the actus reus exists, the notion of "responsible share" amounts to showing
that the defendant was at least negligent in either acting or failing to act. 10 2
Professor Abrams argues that the responsible share language "establishes that the
corporate officer was in a position to exercise some control over the situation that
produced the violation."l0 3 Thus, it seems that in Professor Abrams's view the
actus reus is the officer's omission and the required mens rea is negligence.
Professor Kathleen Brickey takes exception to Professor Abrams's assertion that
the "commonly accepted view of Dotterweich is that the Court 'established strict,
vicarious liability for corporate executives.""0 Professor Brickey argues that
even if the opinion imposed strict liability, Justice Frankfurter's opinion did not
establish "whether liability was vicarious or personal." 105 It was never established
whether Dotterweich's liability stemmed from his own culpable acts and/or
omissions or from acts of his subordinate that were imputed to him. 10 6 Professor
Brickey argues that when looking at the responsible share standard of liability it is
important to put the Park and Dotterweich cases in their appropriate context of
public welfare offenses.107 Once that is taken into account, Professor Brickey
argues that despite the Court's ambiguous language in describing the notion of
responsible share, the Court was not imposing a requirement that the prosecutor
demonstrate the mens rea of the executive.' 08 When speaking of blame and
responsible share, Professor Brickey maintains that the Court was not concerned
98. Abrams, supra note 21, at 464 (quoting United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 281 (1943)).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 465.
101. Id. at465-66.
102. Id. (explaining that strict liability does not "dispense with a culpability approach so much as it frees the
prosecutor from having to prove culpability in the particular case").
103. Id. at 466.
104. Kathleen F. Brickey, Criminal Liability Of Corporate Officers For Strict Liability Offenses-Another
View, 35 VAND. L. REv. 1337, 1348 (1982) (quoting Abrams, supra note 21, at 464).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1345-46.
108. Id. at 1363-64.
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with moral blameworthiness.' 09 Instead, the Court was chiefly concerned with
factual blame."o That makes sense in a strict liability case involving a public
welfare offense.
As Professor Brickey explains, the key issue in these strict liability cases based
on the responsible share doctrine is whether there has been an act or omission and
whether the prosecution can establish causation."' In Dotterweich, the Court
explained that liability will be imposed on "those who possess authority and
supervisory responsibility when their failure to exercise such authority and to
discharge their responsibility results in a violation."ll 2 Professor Brickey argues
that this liability is justified because the important public interests involved in
maintaining a safe food and drug supply require imposing the "'highest standard of
care' on those in the chain of distribution 'who execute the corporate mission.""' 3
It appears that Professor Brickey views the actus reus for a responsible corporate
officer conviction as an omission and finds that there is no mens rea requirement.
Professor Todd S. Aagaard argues that the conventional wisdom explaining
the responsible corporate officer doctrine needs to be reexamined.1 4 Professor
Aagaard rejects the idea that the responsible corporate officer doctrine is justified
because it is used in cases involving public welfare offenses." 5 He also rejects the
notion that the responsible corporate officer doctrine dispenses with the mens rea
requirement.1 6 In Professor Aagaard's view, the only way to justify the respon-
sible corporate officer doctrine is to view it as a crime of omission where it
contractual duty to prevent certain harms exists and the violation of that duty leads
to an outcome "that would be a criminal offense if it were caused by affirmative
conduct."' '7 The contractual relationship exists due to the individual's relationship
to the employer." 8 The employer delegates the duty to prevent the company from
violating the law to the responsible corporate officer." 9 When dealing with a
criminal omission, Professor Aagaard argues that knowledge is demonstrated by
showing that the defendant is "aware of both the duty to act and the facts of the
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1345-46.
112. Id. at 1362 (citing United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 671 (1975)).
113. Id. (quoting Park, 421 U.S. at 671-72).
114. See Todd S. Aagaard, A Fresh Look at the Responsible Relation Doctrine, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
1245 (2006):
115. Id. at 1269-70 (explaining that although the Court mentions the public welfare doctrine in both
Dotterweich and Park, it is too general a concept and does not provide adequate guidance "for deciding where and
why the responsible relation doctrine should apply").
116. Id. at 1271 (arguing that if a public welfare offense is relevant to the mental state required for the crime,
then that mental state or lack thereof exists without reference to the prosecution being based on the responsible
corporate officer doctrine).
117. Id. at 1273-81.
118. Id. at 1281.
119. Id. at 1282.
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situation that trigger[s] the duty."1 2 0 Knowledge can also be proved if the
government can demonstrate that the responsible corporate officer purposefully
decided not to avail herself of the facts that would trigger her duty to act.121 It is not
clear, however, why knowledge as opposed to some lesser form of mens rea is
required. Finally, Professor Aagaard argues that the responsible corporate officer
doctrine is not based on vicarious liability despite the fact that the defendant is
being prosecuted for the criminal conduct of her subordinates.12 2 In his view, the
executive who is being held responsible under the responsible corporate officer
doctrine is being held accountable for his own failure to act to prevent the
subordinate from engaging in the misconduct.12 3 Thus, the defendant has satisfied
both the actus reus and mens rea of the offense herself without referring to the
conduct of the subordinate.12 4
It is no small task to decipher the justification for the responsible corporate
officer doctrine based on the Dotterweich and Park cases. The language of the
opinions does not leave one with a clear impression of whether the executive is
guilty for her own acts or the acts of her subordinates. Further, it is unclear whether
the Court viewed an executive's failure to prevent misconduct as a culpable act
or if that was only true in the cases before the Court where the executives had
knowledge of the problems. Professor Aagaard's explanation of the responsible
corporate officer doctrine is appealing because it appears to provide a moral
justification for punishing individuals for the criminal conduct of their subordi-
nates by recasting the wrongdoing to consist of the executive's failure to act. For
the more recent cases, at least, Professor Aagaard's explanation falls short because
it fails to explain situations where there is liability in the absence of awareness of
the underlying misconduct. Without some awareness of misconduct or the risk
of misconduct, it is unclear how the duty to act would be triggered. Similarly,
Professor Abrams' justification for the responsible corporate officer doctrine
attempts to find a moral justification for punishing executives who were not
directly involved in the wrongdoing. He characterizes the Court's description of a
"responsible share" as demonstrating culpability. If the individuals had some
culpability for the misconduct, then holding them criminally responsible would
certainly be less objectionable. But, the Court also talked about the fact that these
individuals are "otherwise innocent" and that they need not be aware of any
wrongdoing. Ultimately, Professor Brickey's explanation for the responsible
corporate officer doctrine seems the most plausible because it takes account of the
120. Id. at 1288 (explaining that in a situation with affirmative misconduct as opposed to an omission,
knowledge would be satisfied if the act was done "voluntarily and intentionally, and not because of mistake or
accident or other innocent reason").
121. Id. (citing United States v. Ramsey, 785 F.2d 184, 189 (7th Cir. 1986)).
122. Id. at 1289-90.
123. Id.
124. Id.
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unique situation involving public welfare offenses. Further, it reconciles the
Court's confusing language about blame and responsibility with the assertion that
the executives need not be knowledgeable about the misconduct and but for their
relationship of authority they are "otherwise innocent." It makes sense that the
Court would be concerned with factual blame, as opposed to moral blame, because
violations of the FDCA are strict liability offenses where issues of moral blame are
typically irrelevant.
As the FDA ramps up enforcement of the health care laws by prosecuting
responsible corporate officers,12 5 it will be critical to determine what level of
supervisory control an executive must have to be held criminally responsible. That
question has remained unanswered in the Supreme Court and lower court opinions.
Specifically, with respect to pharmaceutical fraud involving off-label promotion, is
it enough that the illegal promotional activities took place someplace in the
executive's command or is it necessary that the individual have specific responsi-
bility in the chain of command for the individuals who engaged in wrongful
behavior? It seems that the level of control over the subordinates would be an
important factor in justifying a conviction based on the responsible corporate
officer doctrine. In addition, the newer cases do not involve allegations that the
executives were aware of the violation. Many of the cases that the courts have
faced thus far, such as Park, Hata, and Starr, involved situations where the
government charged an individual who was aware of the potential violation but did
not take any or enough actions to remedy the violation. It is not entirely clear if the
justification for responsible corporate officer convictions can stand in situations
where the executive never received any type of warning that misconduct might be
taking place. If the justification is to stand, it is most likely on the basis of
Professor Brickey's justification that the Court is not interested in moral blame
when faced with these public welfare offenses.
III. ExCLUSION OF RESPONSIBLE CORPORATE OFFICERS
Federal prosecutors will most likely charge pharmaceutical executives under the
responsible corporate officer doctrine for misdemeanor misbranding in violation
125. The FDA has issued guidance on responsible corporate officer prosecutions in its Regulatory Pro-
cedures Manual. FDA REGULATORY PROCEDURES MANUAL, SPECIAL PROCEDURES AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR PARK
DOCTRINE PROSECUTIONS, § 6-5-3 (2011), available at http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/ComplianceManuals/Regulatory
ProceduresManual/ucml76738.htm#SUB6-5-3. The Regulatory Procedures Manual instructs FDA personnel to
consider "the individual's position in the company and relationship to the violation, and whether the official had
the authority to correct or prevent the violation." Id. The Regulatory Procedures Manual also sets forth seven
factors for FDA personnel to consider, including: (1) whether the violation harmed or could harm the public;
(2) "whether the violation is obvious;" (3) whether the violation is part of a pattern of misconduct; (4) "whether
the violation is widespread;" (5) the seriousness of the violation; (6) the quality of the evidence in support of the
prosecution; and (7) whether the prosecution is good use of agency resources. Id.
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of the FDCA.12 6 Misbranding is a misdemeanor offense punishable by less than
one year in jail,12 7 unless it is undertaken "with the intent to defraud or mislead" in
which case it is a felony punishable by up to three years in jail. 128 Following a
guilty plea or conviction, the executives are faced with both direct and collateral
consequences of their criminal convictions. The direct consequences of conviction
are those that the judge imposes at sentencing, such as jail time, restitution,
disgorgement, and probation. In contrast, the sentencing court is not responsible
for imposing collateral consequences of criminal convictions. Collateral conse-
quences are the "civil restrictions that flow from a criminal conviction." 12 9 There
are two types of collateral consequences. The first type of collateral consequences
are sanctions that occur automatically upon conviction.13 0 The other type involves
discretionary disqualifications that an administrative agency has the authority to
impose on a case-by-case basis.13 1 In the case of health care executives convicted
as responsible corporate officers, the most severe collateral consequence of
conviction is the OIG's discretionary authority to exclude the corporate officers
from participation in federal health care programs.
This Section examines the OIG's wide-ranging authority to impose the collat-
eral consequence of exclusion from participation in federal heatlh care programs
and determine its length. It also scrutinizes the OIG's use of its discretionary
authority to exclude Purdue Pharma executives, who were convicted as respon-
sible corporate officers but were unaware of their subordinates' wrongdoing, for
twenty years. Further, this Section assesses the effect of long periods of exclusion
on executives.
A. Collateral Consequences: Exclusion
The Social Security Act grants the Secretary of the Department of Health and
Human Services the power to exclude individuals and entities from participation in
126. See 21 U.S.C. § 331(a) (2012) (prohibiting "the introduction or delivery for introduction into interstate
commerce of any. . . drug ... that is adulterated or misbranded"). Under the FDCA, a drug or device is
misbranded if its label is false or misleading. 21 U.S.C. § 352(a) (2012). A drug is also misbranded if it does not
contain "adequate directions for use." 21 U.S.C. § 352(f).
127. 21 U.S.C. § 333(a)(1) (2012).
128. 21 U.S.C. § 333(a)(2).
129. Nora V. Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile: The Need for Restrictions on Collateral Sentencing
Consequences, 11 STAN. L. & Po' Y REv. 153, 154 (1999). In contrast, direct consequences of criminal conviction
are "limited to the penal sanction that will be imposed as a result of a plea of guilty." Jenny Roberts, The Mythical
Divide Between Collateral and Direct Consequences of Criminal Convictions: Involuntary Commitment of
"Sexually Violent Predators," 93 MINN. L. REv. 670, 678-79 (2008). The courts have struggled with distinguish-
ing direct from collateral consequences and have put forth three different definitions of direct consequences. Id. at
689. Courts have looked at whether the consequence is (1) "definite, immediate and largely automatic";
(2) "punitive"; and (3) "within the control and responsibility of the sentencing court." Id. (internal quotations and
citations omitted).
130. Joy Radice, Administering Justice: Removing Statutory Barriers to Reentry, 83 U. COLO. L. REv. 715,
717 (2012) (citing ABA, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: COLLATERAL SANCTIONS AND DISCRETIONARY
DIsQuAUIncAnON OF CoNvIcrED PERSONS I (3d ed. 2004)).
131. Id. at717-18.
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federal health care programs. The Secretary has delegated the exclusion authority
to the OIG. Congress created the OIG in 1976 and tasked it with conducting audits
and investigations "to reduce the likelihood of fraud and abuse" in the Medicare
and Medicaid programs.13 2 The OIG has had the power to exclude since 1977.
The OIG's power to exclude individuals and entities that have engaged in fraud or
abuse involving federal health care programs, such as Medicare and Medicaid, has
grown exponentially over the years.13 4 If the OIG excludes an individual or entity
from federal health care programs, those programs may not pay for any item or
services furnished directly or indirectly by the excluded individual or entity. 3 5
Congress created the exclusion remedy to "protect the Medicare and Medicaid
programs and beneficiaries."
132. KATHLEEN S. SWENDIMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 97-895 A, HEALTH CARE FRAUD: ABRIEF SUMMARY
OF LAW AND FEDERAL ANTI-FRAUD ACTIVITIES 3 (1997) (quoting S. REP. No. 94-1324, at 3-14 (1976); 42 U.S.C.
§ 3521 (1977)), available at www.opencrs.com/document/97-895/.
133. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., SPECIAL ADVISORY BULLETIN ON THE EFFECT OF EXCLUSION FROM PARICIPA-
TION IN FEDERAL HEALTH CARE PROGRAMS (May. 2013), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/exclusions/files/sab-
05092013.pdf. The power was provided by the Medicare-Medicaid Anti-Fraud and Abuse Amendments, Public
Law 95-142. Id. The objective of those amendments was to "strengthen the capability of the government to detect,
prosecute, and punish fraudulent activities under the Medicare and Medicaid programs." Medicare and Medicaid
Anti-Fraud and Abuse Amendments, Pub. L. No. 95-142, 91 Stat. 1175 (1977). The amendments established the
State Medicaid Fraud Control Units to investigate provider fraud and patient abuse. Medicare and Medicaid
Anti-Fraud and Abuse Amendments, Pub. L. No. 95-142, § 17, 91 Stat. 1175 (1977). The amendments also
provided ninety percent federal funding for three years for the states to operate their Medicaid Fraud Control
Units. Id.
134. In the beginning, the OIG's power to exclude was confined to cases where a physician or other
practitioner was criminally convicted for an offense involving the Medicare and Medicaid programs. OFFICE OF
INSPECTOR GEN., SPECIAL ADVISORY BULLETIN, supra note 133. The OIG first obtained the authority to exclude
entities from participation in Medicare and Medicaid in 1981. Id. The Civil Monetary Penalties Law gave OIG the
authority to impose exclusions on individuals and entities that submitted false or improper claims for payment by
Medicare and Medicaid. Id. In 1987, the Medicare and Medicaid Patient and Program Protection Act (MMPPPA)
enhanced anti-fraud efforts by giving the OIG more authority to impose administrative sanctions. SWENDIMAN,
supra note 132, at 3-4; Pub. L. No. 100-93 (1987). The MMPPPA enhanced OIG's authority to exclude by giving
it the permissive power to exclude individuals or entities convicted of misdemeanors "relating to fraud, theft,
embezzlement, breach of fiduciary responsibility, or financial abuse." S. Rep. 100-109 (1987), reprinted in 1987
U.S.C.C.A.N. 687. In 1996, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) further
strengthened the OIG's exclusion authority. Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 136 (1996). HIPAA gave the OG
more power to impose mandatory exclusions, set forth minimum periods of permissive exclusion, and created a
new exclusion authority for "individuals with ownership or control interest in sanctioned entities." Health Care
Programs: Fraud and Abuse; Revised OIG Exclusion Authorities Resulting from Public Law 104-191, 63 Fed.
Reg. 46,676 (Sept. 2, 1998) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 1000, 1001, 1002, and 1005).
135. 42 C.F.R. § 1001.2.
[A]n exclusion from Federal health care programs effectively precludes an excluded individual or
entity from being employed by, or under contract with, any practitioner, provider or supplier to
provide any items and services reimbursed by a Federal health care program. This broad
prohibition applies whether the Federal reimbursement is based on itemized claims, cost reports,
fee schedules or PPS.
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., SPECIAL ADVISORY BULLETIN, supra note 133.
136. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., SPECIAL ADVISORY BULLETIN, supra note 133.
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The OIG's exclusion authority is mandatory in some cases and discretionary in
others. Exclusion is mandatory if the individual or entity is convicted of a felony
offense "relating to" health care fraud or the manufacture or distribution of a
controlled substance.137 The mandatory exclusion period is a minimum of five
years.' 3 ' Exclusion is permissive if the individual or entity is convicted of a
misdemeanor offense "relating to" fraud in connection with the delivery of a health
care item or service or the unlawful distribution of a controlled substance. 3 1
Permissive exclusions are presumptively for a period of three years unless there
are mitigating or aggravating circumstances that lead to either a shorter or longer
period of exclusion. 4 0 Importantly, the OIG also has permissive exclusion
authority to exclude an entity controlled by a sanctioned individual.'41 In addition,
an entity will risk civil monetary penalties and its participation in federal health
care programs if it employs an excluded individual to provide health care items or
services that are reimbursable directly or indirectly by the federal health care
programs.14 2 As a result, the practical effect of the exclusion of an individual is that
137. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(a)(3), (4) (2012). A mandatory exclusion could result from a felony conviction
"relating to the unlawful manufacture, distribution, prescription, or dispensing of a controlled substance."
42 U.S.C. §I 1320a-7(a)(4). Exclusion is also mandatory if an individual or entity is convicted of a program-related
crime or a crime related to patient abuse. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(a)(1), (2).
138.-42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(c)(3)(B). There is, however, an exception if the individual or entity is "the sole
community physician or sole source of essential specialized services in a community" and the exclusion would
impose a hardship on federal health care program beneficiaries. Id.
139. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(b)(1), (3). The OIG also has permissive exclusion authority if (1) an entity or
individual is convicted of obstruction of an investigation or audit concerning health care fraud and abuse,
42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(b)(2); (2) an individual or entity has had its license to provide health services revoked or
suspended, 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(b)(4); or (3) an individual or entity has been excluded or suspended under any
federal or state program involving the delivery of health care, 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(b)(5).
140. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(c)(3)(D). The OIG also has the permissive authority to exclude individuals who
have a "direct or indirect ownership or control interest in a sanctioned entity and who know[] or should know of
the action constituting the basis for the conviction or exclusion" and individuals who are officers or managing
employees of the sanctioned entity. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(b)(15)(A)(i), (ii). A sanctioned entity is one that has been
excluded from federal or state health care programs or convicted of (1) any offense leading to a mandatory
exclusion; (2) a misdemeanor relating to health care fraud or controlled substances; or (3) an offense relating to
obstruction of a health care fraud investigation. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(b)(15)(B)(i), (ii). Thus, the OIG can use an
entity's guilty plea to a misdemeanor offense to exercise its permissive authority to exclude owners, officers, or
managing employees, even if the OIG did not exclude the entity. A person or entity is "convicted" of a criminal
offense under the statute if the person or entity entered a plea of guilty that has been accepted by a court. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1320a-7(i)(3). The regulations provide that owners, officers, and managers should receive the same period of
exclusion as the sanctioned entity. 42 C.F.R. § 1001.1051(c)(1) (2012). If the entity was not sanctioned, the
owner, officer, or manager's period of exclusion "will be determined by considering the factors that would have
been considered if the entity had been excluded." 42 C.F.R. § 1001.1051(c)(2).
141. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(b)(8) (explaining that entities are controlled by individuals who have direct or
indirect ownership in the entity and who are officers, directors, agents, or managing employees).
142. See OFFICE OF INSPECIOR GEN., SPECIAL ADvIsoRY BULLETIN, supra note 133.
If a health care provider arranges or contracts (by employment or otherwise) with a person that the
provider knows or should know is excluded by OIG, the provider may be subject to [Civil
Monetary Penalty (CMP)] liability if the excluded person provides services payable, directly or
indirectly, by a Federal health care program. OIG may impose CMPs of up to $10,000 for each
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the person is virtually unemployable by a health care provider.143
The OIG has issued guidance on the factors it will examine to determine when
permissive exclusion of owners, officers, and managing employees of a sanctioned
entity is appropriate under § 1128(b)(15) of the Social Security Act. It has not
issued guidance on the permissive exclusion of individuals convicted of misdemean-
ors "relating to" fraud. Nevertheless, the guidance on the exclusion of officers and
managing employees may provide some insight into the OIG's decision making
into whether executives should be permissively excluded for misdemeanor convic-
tions "relating to" fraud. Some of the factors for the exclusion of officers and
managing employees seem pretty standard. The OIG will examine the circum-
stances of the misconduct and seriousness of the offense, the individual's role in
the sanctioned entity, the individual's actions in response to the misconduct, and
information about the entity.' Interestingly, the exclusion provision concerning
officers and managing employees of sanctioned entities does not contain a
knowledge requirement.14 5 Perhaps that provides some justification for the OIG's
thinking that the knowledge of the executives should be irrelevant to the exclusion
determination. Although the OIG states that it does not intend to exclude all
officers and managing employees, it notes that it "has the authority to exclude
every officer and managing employee of a sanctioned entity."14 6 The OIG defines a
managing employee as any individual "who exercises operational or managerial
control over the entity or who directly or indirectly conducts the day-to-day
operations of the entity."l 4 7 In particular, the OIG identifies directors, managers,
general managers, and administrators as potential "managing employees" under
the act.14 8 The OIG will employ a presumption in favor of exclusion that can only
be overcome if there are "significant factors" that counsel against exclusion.14 9
The OIG does not specify what "significant factors" might overcome the presump-
tion in favor of exclusion. Perhaps the OIG is using the same presumption in favor
of exclusion when it comes to executives of companies that have engaged in
item or service furnished by the excluded person for which Federal program payment is sought, as
well as an assessment of up to three times the amount claimed, and program exclusion.
Id.
143. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., SPECIAL ADVISORY BULLETIN, supra note 133, (explaining that there are two
"limited" situations where a provider can employ an excluded individual: (1) "if Federal health care programs do
not pay, directly or indirectly, for the items or services being provided by the excluded individual," or (2) if the
provider only "employs or contracts with an excluded person to furnish items or services solely to non-Federal
health care program beneficiaries.").
144. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., GUIDANCE FOR IMPLEMENTING PERMISSIVE EXCLUSION AUTHORITY UNDER
SECTION 1128(B)(15) OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT, available at https://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/exclusions/files/
permissiveexcl-under_1128bl5 10192010.pdf.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
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fraudulent conduct. And, it is possible that the OIG believes that it has the
authority to exclude any executive convicted of a misdemeanor "relating to" fraud.
The actual exclusion determination for executives who have been convicted of
misdemeanor offenses "relating to" fraud remains a mystery. Once the OIG has
decided to exclude an executive convicted of a misdemeanor offense "relating to"
fraud, however, there are specific aggravating and mitigating factors that the OIG
will examine to determine the length of the exclusion. As previously stated, the
base period of exclusion for a permissive exclusion is three years.' 50 The OIG will
increase the base period of exclusion if the acts committed by the individual or
entity resulted in a financial loss of $5000 or more or the acts were committed over
a year or more.' 5 ' In addition, the length of exclusion will increase if the individual
or entity's acts had an adverse impact, whether it be physical or mental, on a
program beneficiary.'5 2 Further, the OIG will increase the exclusion period if the
court imposed a sentence that included incarceration or if the entity or individual
has a documented history of wrongdoing. 1 Finally, the OIG can increase the
length of exclusion if the individual or entity was convicted of crimes in addition
to the crime that is the basis of the exclusion.15 4
The OIG will shorten the length of exclusion if the conviction of the individual
or entity was for three offenses or less and the amount of financial loss is less than
$1500.' In addition, the exclusion period will be reduced if the "individual had
a mental, emotional or physical condition, before or during the commission of the
offense, that reduced the individual's culpability." 5 6 Further, the OIG will
decrease the length of exclusion if the individual or entity cooperated with the
government and as a result of that cooperation others were (1) convicted or
excluded; (2) investigated; or (3) subject to a civil monetary penalty.' 57 Finally, the
OIG will shorten a period of exclusion if the health care items or services furnished
by the sanctioned entity or individual are unavailable from other sources.' 5 1
In short, the OIG has extensive authority to debar individuals and executives for
a wide range of offenses. While there are base periods of exclusion based on
whether the offense is a misdemeanor or felony, there are not any outer limits on
the OIG's ability to increase the exclusion period beyond the base period through
aggravating factors. In cases where the individual or entity is a grave danger to the
federal health care programs, the power to increase the base period of exclusion
will likely be seen as an advantage. In situations where the individual is convicted
150. 42 C.F.R. § 1001.201(b)(1) (2012).
151. 42 C.F.R. § 1001.201(b)(2)(i)-(ii).
152. 42 C.F.R. § 1001.201(b)(2)(iii).
153. 42 C.F.R. § 1001.201(b)(2)(iv)-(v).
154. 42 C.F.R. § 1001.201(b)(2)(vi).
155. 42 C.F.R. § 1001.201(b)(3)(i).
156. 42 C.F.R. § 1001.201(b)(3)(ii).
157. 42 C.F.R. § 1001.201(b)(3)(iii)(A)-(C).
158. 42 C.F.R. § 1001.201(b)(3)(iv).
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as a responsible corporate officer, however, the authority to extend the base period
of exclusion is potentially subject to misuse or abuse.
B. Purdue Pharma
A prominent example of the OIG's use of its broad exclusion authority is the
Purdue Pharma case. The FDA investigated Purdue Pharmal5 9 for marketing
violations concerning its pain drug OxyContin.16 0 OxyContin is a time-released
version of oxycodone and is intended for long-term relief of "moderate to severe
pain." 161 Purdue Pharma's market research showed that doctors had concerns
about the drug's abuse potential, side effects, and risk of patient addiction.16 2 Thus,
Purdue Pharma engaged in a "campaign of misinformation" to allay the concerns
of doctors and increase sales of OxyContin.16 3 From approximately January 1996
to June 2001, Purdue Pharma supervisors and employees marketed and promoted
OxyContin as less addictive than other pain medications because of OxyContin's
twelve-hour-release.'6" Specifically, supervisors claimed that intravenous abuse
was more difficult with OxyContin, that it created less risk of addiction than
immediate release opioids, that patients would not develop a tolerance to the drug
or experience withdrawal symptoms, and that it caused less euphoria than
immediate-release opioids.' 6 5 Even though the FDA-approved label stated that the
"[d]elayed absorption, as provided by OxyContin tablets, is believed to reduce the
abuse liability of a drug,"16 6 Purdue Pharma never provided the FDA with any
clinical studies that proved that OxyContin was less addictive than immediate-
release versions of oxycodone.167 Indeed, Purdue Pharma's own studies demon-
strated that patients experienced addiction to OxyContin and that they suffered
from withdrawal symptoms upon terminating its use.' 68
After a five-year investigation into Purdue Pharma's marketing of OxyContin,
159. Ultimately, however, the government pursued criminal charges against Purdue Frederick Company, Inc.,
a subsidiary of Purdue Pharma. Thus, the Information and plea agreement references Purdue Frederick Company,
Inc. rather than Purdue Pharma. This Article refers to the company as Purdue Pharma because the executives were
employed by Purdue Pharma, not Purdue Frederick.
160. Oxycontin is "an opioid analgesic approved to be taken every twelve hours. OxyContin is a controlled-
release form of oxycodone and is a Schedule II controlled substance with an abuse liability similar to morphine."
Information, United States v. The Purdue Frederick Company, Inc., No. 1:07CR00029 at I (W.D. Va. May 10,
2007) [hereinafter Information].
161. Id. at 5.
162. Goldenheim v. Inspector General, DAB No. 2268, at 6 (Dep't of Health & Human Servs. 2009) (final
admin. review), available at http://www.hhs.gov/dab/decisions/dabdecisions/dab2268.pdf.
163. Id. at 5.
164. Information, supra note 160, at 5-6, 15. The information does not specify the number of supervisors and
employees involved in the unlawful promotion. Similarly, the information does not specify where these
supervisors and employees were on the Purdue hierarchy.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 5.
167. Id. at 4.
168. Goldenheim, DAB No. 2268, at 6.
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the government entered into a global settlement with Purdue Pharma that included
a Corporate Integrity Agreement, a fine, and a plea of guilty by Purdue Frederick
Company, Inc. (a subsidiary of Purdue Pharma), to felony misbranding with intent
to defraud or mislead.16 9 Because the government charged Purdue Frederick
Company, Inc., Purdue Pharma was not subject to exclusion from federal health
care programs. In addition to the charges against the subsidiary, the government
charged three Purdue Pharma executives-Michael Friedman, Howard Udell, and
Paul D. Goldenheim-as responsible corporate officers, with misdemeanor counts
of introducing a misbranded drug into interstate commerce in violation of the
FDCA.o7 0 Although each executive held various positions throughout his tenure at
Purdue Pharma, at the time they were charged Michael Friedman was President
and Chief Executive Officer, Howard Udell was Executive Vice President and
Chief Legal Officer, and Paul Goldenheim, who left Purdue Pharma in 2004,
was the Executive Vice President of Worldwide Research & Development and
Chief Scientific Officer.17 ' All three of the high-level executives entered guilty
pleas to the misdemeanor misbranding charge.17 2 The district court accepted the
plea agreements even though they did not impose prison sentences because of an
"absence of government proof of knowledge by the individual defendants of the
wrongdoing." 7 3
On March 31, 2008, the OIG sent notices to Friedman, Udell, and Goldenheim
and informed them that they would each be excluded from participation in federal
health care programs for twenty years.17 4 The exclusions were based on their
misdemeanor convictions as responsible corporate officers. According to the
Inspector General, the misbranding offense "relat[ed] to fraud, theft, embezzle-
ment, breach of fiduciary responsibility, or other financial misconduct in con-
nection with the delivery of a health care item or service," and "to the unlawful
manufacture, distribution, prescription or dispensing of a controlled substance." 75
Because these were permissive exclusions, the base period of exclusion would
have been three years. Any increase in the exclusion period would have to be
justified on the basis of aggravating factors.
The executives sought review of the Inspector General's decision. After briefing
169. See John R. Fleder, The OxyContin Case-Something for Everyone, Update: Food and Drug Law,
Regulation, and Education, Sept.-Oct. 2007, available at http://www.hpm.com/pdf/46-48_ENFORCEMENT
CORNER.pdf.
170. See Plea Agreement, United States v. Michael Friedman, No. 1:07CR29 (W.D. Va. May 10, 2007); Plea
Agreement, United States v. Howard Udell, No. 1:07CR29 (W.D. Va. May 10, 2007); Plea Agreement, United
States v. Paul Goldenheim, No. 1:07CR29 (W.D. Va. May 10, 2007); see also 21 U.S.C. § 333(a)(1) (2006).
171. Information, supra note 160, at 1-2.
172. See Friedman, Udell and Paul Plea Agreements, supra note 170. The court accepted the pleas on July 23,
2007. See United States v. Purdue Frederick Co., et al., 495 F. Supp. 2d 569, 576 (W.D. Va. 2007).
173. United States v. Purdue Frederick Co., et al., 495 F. Supp. 2d 569, 576 (W.D. Va. 2007).
174. Goldenheim v. Inspector General, DAB No. 2268, at 7 (Dep't of Health & Human Servs. Aug. 28, 2009)
(final admin. review).
175. Id.
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was complete, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) reduced the period of
exclusion to fifteen years based on information provided by the executives that
demonstrated their cooperation with law enforcement officials (a mitigating
factor).' 7 6 The executives argued that they had no intent to defraud and that their
convictions rested solely on their status as responsible corporate officers rather
than their own misconduct.'7 7 The ALJ found that despite the fact that they were
convicted as responsible corporate officers, their misbranding offenses were
offenses "relating to fraud" because of the relationship between the executives'
conduct and Purdue's fraudulent misbranding. 78 Further, the ALJ found that even
though the executives lacked personal knowledge of the misconduct, they were not
"blameless" because they each acknowledged that they were responsible corporate
officers who had the "'responsibility and authority' to prevent in the first instance
or to correct promptly the conduct that resulted in the drug's misbranding."l 7 9
Finally, the ALJ determined that the fifteen year period of exclusion was reason-
able due to the existence of three aggravating factors and only one mitigating
factor.' 80
On appeal, the executives argued that their convictions were not related to
fraud because, unlike Purdue Frederick Company, Inc., they were not convicted of
fraudulent conduct.' 8 ' The Departmental Appeals Board (DAB), however, was
not convinced. It found, based on the plain language of the exclusion provision,
that the statute "does not restrict exclusions to only offenses constituting or
consisting of fraud, but requires merely that the offense at issue be one 'relating to'
fraud."l 8 2 The DAB found that an offense "relating to" fraud is one that has
some "nexus" or "common sense connection" to fraud.18 3 In the DAB's view, the
misdemeanor misbranding offense clearly related to fraud because without Purdue
Frederick's fraudulent misbranding there would not have been any charges against
the executives.18 4 Thus, the executives' lack of knowledge concerning or role in
the fraudulent conduct was irrelevant.18 5
The executives also argued that their exclusions were improper because the
exclusions did not serve the remedial purpose of the exclusion statute. The
exclusion statute is meant to protect federal health care programs from untrust-
176. Id.
177. Id. at 2, 13.
178. Id. at 8 (internal citations omitted).
179. Id. at 8.
180. Id. at 9 (finding aggravating factors "relating to the financial losses to government programs, the duration
of the offenses, and the impact of those offenses on individuals").
181. Id. at 10.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 8.
184. Id. at 10-12.
185. Id. at 13 (rejecting the argument that their convictions were not related to fraud because they had no
knowledge of Purdue's fraudulent conduct and were only convicted of a strict liability offense).
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worthy individuals. 18 6 The executives argued that they were not untrustworthy
because there was no evidence that they "'acted, or failed to act, knowingly,
intentionally, recklessly, negligently, or in any manner that is in the slightest degree
personally blameworthy."' 18 7 The DAB found, however, that the executives'
failure to prevent or discover the ongoing fraudulent conduct while they were in
charge meant that they were culpable and to blame for the misconduct of Purdue's
employees.188 As such, the ALJ could have reasonably concluded that they were
not "reliable or worthy of confidence."' 89 Ultimately, the DAB upheld the
exclusion but reduced it to a period of twelve years because it found that the ALJ
increased the period of exclusion based on an aggravating factor that was not
supported by substantial evidence.190
The executives sought review of the final decision excluding them from
participation in federal health care programs for twelve years in federal district
court.' 9' Again, the executives argued that their misbranding offense was not an
offense "relating to" fraud and that the period of exclusion was unreasonable
because they lacked culpability.19 2 The District Court rejected both of the execu-
tives' arguments and held that the Secretary's decision was supported by substan-
tial evidence.19 3 The court applied the two-step framework from Chevron, U.S.A.
Inc. v. Natural Resource Defense Council, Inc. 194 to review the DAB's decision
that an offense "relating to" fraud is one that has some "nexus" or "common
sense connection" to fraud.' 9 5 The court found that the DAB's interpretation was
reasonable because it comported with the plain meaning of the term and was
consistent with prior courts' interpretations of similar language in the exclusion
statute.19 6 The court also affirmed the twelve-year exclusion period because the
length of exclusion was within the Secretary's discretion and was supported by the
record.' 9 7
186. Id. at 14.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 16-17 (explaining that under Park and Dotterweich their "convictions under the FDCA mean[t]
that, as Purdue's senior executives, they had, but failed to exercise, the duty and responsibility, and the power and
authority, to learn about and curtail the fraudulent activities of Purdue employees"). The Appellate Division also
noted that if the executives wanted to demonstrate that the misconduct occurred despite their vigilance, they
should have gone to trial and argued that they were powerless to prevent the fraudulent conduct. Id. at 17.
189. Id. at 18.
190. Id. at 25-26 (explaining that the ALJ was wrong to find that the crimes of the executives had an adverse
impact on program beneficiaries because there was no showing of a causal connection between the misbranding
and the individuals who abused or were addicted to OxyContin).
191. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(f)(1) (2012) (stating that any excluded individual or entity is eligible for judicial
review of the exclusion).
192. Friedman v. Sebelius, 755 F. Supp. 2d 98, 105 (D.D.C. 2010).
193. Id. at 117.
194. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
195. Friedman, 755 F. Supp. 2d at 107-10.
196. Id. at 107-08.
197. Id. at 117.
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On appeal to the D.C. Circuit, the Purdue executives argued that in order to be
excluded based on a misdemeanor conviction related to fraud the misdemeanor
conviction "must comprise the 'core elements' of fraud, one of which is scien-
ter.",1 s A misdemeanor misbranding offense is a strict liability crime and does not
have a mens rea requirement. The D.C. Circuit found that the "circumstance-
specific approach," which required the court to examine the facts and circum-
stances of conviction to determine if the conviction was "factually related to
fraud," was appropriate.1 99 As the executives' convictions were based on being in
charge during the time that Purdue supervisors and employees committed felony
misbranding with intent to defraud or mislead,20 it would be nearly impossible to
argue that the executives' misdemeanor misbranding convictions were not factu-
ally related to fraud. 2 0 1 Thus, the D.C. Circuit's adoption of the circumstance-
specific approach sealed the Purdue executives' fate and the exclusion was upheld.
The Purdue executives had more success, however, with respect to their
challenge to the length of their exclusions. The Purdue executives argued that
the Secretary had departed from prior agency decisions and failed to justify the
departure.20 2 In particular, the cases that the DAB cited in upholding the twelve-
year exclusion were inapposite because they involved mandatory exclusions
with a minimum exclusion period of five years.20 3 Thus, the DAB could not rely on
those cases to justify the period of exclusion for the Purdue executives.2
Accordingly, the D.C. Circuit found that the decision of the DAB concerning
the length of exclusion was arbitrary and capricious and remanded the case for
reconsideration.2 05
In dissent, Judge Williams argued that the Secretary's broad interpretation of
"misdemeanor relating to fraud" took the phrase out of the context of the exclusion
statute.2 06 He explained that the context in this statute "suggests a requirement of
at least some approximation of the moral turpitude associated with 'fraud'
itself."207 Thus, Judge Williams found the Secretary's definition of "relating to" as
requiring a nexus was not an "analytically reasonable interpretation."20 8
198. Friedman v. Sebelius, 686 F.3d 813, 818 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
199. Id. at 820.
200. Id. at 816 (explaining that the executives were convicted "for their admitted failure to prevent Purdue's
fraudulent marketing of OxyContin").
201. Id. at 824 (explaining that the Purdue executives "do not dispute they are excludable under this
circumstance-specific approach").
202. Id. at 826.
203. Id. at 827.
204. Id. at 828.
205. Id. (explaining that the case would be remanded to the district court "with instructions to remand it to the
agency for further consideration consistent with this opinion").
206. Id. at 831 (Williams, J., dissenting) (explaining that the "meaning of a statute must not be confused with
its simple linguistic potential").
207. Id.
208. Id. at 832.
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C. Lessons From the Exclusion of the Purdue Pharma Executives
The remarkable thing about the Purdue Pharma case is not just that the
executives received twelve-year exclusions for the wrongdoing of their subordi-
nates; it is that the connection between their conduct and the sanction was so
attenuated. There was no evidence put forth that the executives knew about the
misbranding of OxyContin. Indeed, their convictions did not require any showing
of mens rea because misdemeanor misbranding was a strict liability offense. Their
exclusion was based solely on the notion that their misdemeanor convictions were
convictions "relating to" fraud. Of course, fraud requires a showing of scienter
which could not be shown in the executives' case. Thus, to find that a misdemeanor
strict liability offense that required no mens rea was a conviction "relating to"
fraud, which required mens rea, the ALJ explained that the executives' misde-
meanor misbranding convictions were based on the company's conviction for
fraudulent misbranding.
Even if one were to accept the broad definition given to "relating to," the
Secretary still failed to justify the executives' twelve-year exclusion in light of the
goal of the exclusion statute. The purpose of exclusion is essentially risk preven-
tion. 2 0 9 The government needs to be able to safeguard the federal health care
programs and their participants from individuals who have defrauded the govern-
ment or caused some other program-related harm. In that sense, the exclusion is
for utilitarian reasons because the excluded individual's loss from the inability to
participate in federal health care programs is outweighed by the need to prevent an
untrustworthy individual from harming the program in the future. If the exclusion
period is severely disproportionate to the potential harm of the individual,
however, the exclusion begins to look like it is motivated by a desire to punish
rather than a desire to protect the federal health care programs.
Thus, if an individual is to be excluded, then the exclusion period should be
proportional to the harm inflicted by the individual and the potential for future
harm by the individual. As Professor Ewald has argued, "[w]hen the punitive
elements of a sentence are premised on proportionality, the collateral conse-
quences of conviction should be held to the same standard."2 10 Because the
prosecutor recognized that the individual executives had no knowledge of or
involvement in the misconduct, they received three years of probation and paid
large fines. As the district court judge explained in accepting the plea deals, "in the
absence of government proof of knowledge by the individual defendants of the
209. The purpose of exclusion is to protect federal health care programs and participants from "untrustworthy
healthcare providers, i.e., individuals and entitites whose behavior has demonstrated that they pose a risk to
program beneficiaries or to the integrity of these programs." 67 Fed. Reg. 11,928, 11,928 (Mar. 18, 2002).
210. Alec C. Ewald, "Civil Death": The Ideological Paradox of Criminal Disenfranchisement Law in the
United States, 2002 Wis. L. REv. 1045, 1099 (2002).
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wrongdoing, prison sentences are not appropriate."211 But, neither the exclusion
nor its length related specifically to the conduct of the executives or their
culpability. Instead, the Secretary applied aggravating factors to lengthen the
period of exclusion from its base level of three years due to the actions of others.
The aggravating factors-financial losses to government programs, duration of the
offenses, and the impact of those offenses on individuals-do not relate to the
failure of the executives to discover and remedy the misconduct. It is unclear how
an extended period of exclusion is warranted for an individual based solely on the
conduct of others. The OIG should exclude an individual based on the risk that the
individual poses to federal health care programs. At a minimum, the length of
exclusion for the individual should be tied to the wrongdoing and risk that the
individual will violate the law in the future.
IV. THE MORAL BLAMEWORTHINESS OF RESPONSIBLE CORPORATE OFFICERS
The fundamental problem with imposing significant collateral consequences on
individuals convicted as responsible corporate officers is that neither their prosecu-
tion nor their collateral consequences are based on their intent or conduct. In most
cases, it is based on a failure to act. As the Supreme Court explained in Morissette
v. United States,2 12 "to constitute guilt there must be not only a wrongful act, but a
criminal intention." 2 13 Strict liability regulatory offenses, such as violations of the
FDCA, are the exception to the principle that criminal conduct must be accompa-
nied by moral blameworthiness.
With strict liability regulatory offenses, the concern is the protection of
society.214 "The objective of the law is not to cure or change the mental processes
of the defendant. There is no thought of social treatment or rehabilitation. The
law's aim is not reformatory, but almost exclusively deterrent, to prevent future
repetitions of similar offenses."2 15 If the prosecutor actually had to prove "spe-
cific authorization or actual knowledge and acquiescence," she would be unable to
obtain a conviction in most cases because of "secret instructions and covert
understandings" between the wrongdoer and the responsible corporate officer.2 16
The common thinking is that in these cases, which ordinarily involve misde-
meanor offenses and minor criminal penalties, 2 17 "the courts can afford to
211. United States v. Purdue Frederick Co., et al., 495 F. Supp. 2d 569, 576 (W.D. Va. 2007).
212. 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
213. Id. at 274 (quoting People v. Flack, 26 N.E. 267, 274 (N.Y. 1891)) (internal quotations omitted).
214. Morissette, 342 U.S. at 257 (1952) (quoting People v. Roby, 18 N.W. 365, 366 (Mich. 1884)) ("Many
statutes which are in the nature of police regulations, as this is, impose criminal penalties irrespective of any intent
to violate them, the purpose being to require a degree of diligence for the protection of the public which shall
render violation impossible") (internal quotations omitted).
215. Francis Sayre, Criminal Responsibility for the Acts ofAnother, 43 HARV. L. REv. 689, 722 (1930).
216. Id.
217. There are, however, strict liability felony offenses such as statutory rape and felony murder.
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disregard the individual in protecting the social interest.",2 18 In particular, the
courts can turn a blind eye to the "defendant's state of mind or lack of individual
blameworthiness."2 19
Given that violations of the FDCA could potentially lead to serious injury or
death, it makes sense to have the responsible corporate officer doctrine as a strong
deterrent for corporate executives. When it comes to the initial misdemeanor
criminal conviction and minor criminal punishment, the interests of the public are
paramount and outweigh an executive's lack of moral blameworthiness in a given
case. The question becomes, however, whether that justification holds when there
are significant and long lasting collateral consequences that attach to that convic-
tion. This Section contends that it does not. It argues that responsible corporate
officers should not be debarred for a period greater than three years, the statutory
baseline for permissive exclusion, without a showing that the officer is morally
blameworthy for her subordinates' transgressions.
A. Exclusion is a Harsh Remedy
Exclusion from participation in federal health care programs for a prolonged
period of time, while technically a civil penalty, is far harsher than the potential
criminal penalty for a misdemeanor misbranding violation. Using the example of
the Purdue executives, the criminal penalty for their misdemeanor misbranding
violations included fines, disgorgement, and three years of probation. Even if they
had been sent to prison, the maximum sentence would have been less than a year.
In contrast, the OIG initially wanted to debar the executives for a period of twenty
years. Thus, the proposed collateral consequences of their convictions would have
lasted seventeen years after their probation ended. Ordinarily, once an individual
has completed probation, the individual has "paid his or her debt to society" in the
eyes of the law. 2 2 0 Indeed, Professor Nora Demleitner argues that collateral
consequences that "are not discontinued within a reasonable period of time ...
interfere with the ex-offender's rehabilitative efforts by continuing to stigmatize
and label him." 2 21 The exclusions effectively ended the careers of the Purdue
Pharma executives in the health care industry and forever labeled them as
untrustworthy criminals.
218. Francis Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REv. 55, 69-70 (1933). See also Morissette,
342 U.S. at 256 (explaining that "penalties commonly are relatively small, and conviction does no grave damage
to an offender's reputation").
219. Sayre, Criminal Responsibility, supra note 215, at 720.
220. Robert M.A. Johnson, Collateral Consequences, CRIM. JUST., Fall 2001, at 32, 32.
221. Demleitner, supra note 129, at 161-62 (arguing that "[olnly strong preventive reasons can justify long or
permanent collateral consequences" that continue after "probation, parole, or supervised release has expired").
See also Margaret Colgate Love, Starting Over with a Clean Slate: In Praise of a Forgotten Section of the Model
Penal Code, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1705, 1705 (2003) (explaining that because the collateral consequences of a
criminal conviction remain after the criminal sentence has been served, ex-offenders are deprived of the "tools
necessary to reestablish themselves as law-abiding and productive members of the free community").
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Professor Gabriel Chin argues that these types of overly restrictive collateral
consequences bear a striking resemblance to a form of punishment that the
United States once had: "civil death."22 2 In the nineteenth century, civil death
statutes took away the civil and political rights of felons "on the theory that they
ceased to exist as legal persons after their conviction."22 3 Convicted felons were
unable to inherit or bequeath property. 2 2 4 Felons could not enter into contracts.
They were also unable to vote.2 25 In essence, convicted felons were no longer
protected by the law. 2 2 6 In the 1960s civil death statutes fell out of favor because
law reformers worked to minimize the collateral consequences of conviction and
restore the forfeited rights.2 2 7 Eventually legislators recognized that the ex-felons
would need to be full participants in society.2 2 8
In the 1980s and 1990s, however, federal and state legislatures began enacting
collateral consequences that would severely restrict ex-offenders' ability to reinte-
grate into society.2 2 9 Federal laws barred people with convictions from many
public benefits and encouraged their exclusion from government employment and
230
contracts.20 In addition to the growth in collateral consequences, there has also
been increased access to and awareness of criminal records, which makes it more
difficult for ex-offenders to reintegrate once they have paid their debt to society.
Professor Chin argues that these collateral consequences are the new form of "civil
death." 2 3 ' As he explains it, "[f]or many people convicted of crimes, the most
severe and long-lasting effect of conviction is not imprisonment or fine. Rather, it
is being subjected to collateral consequences .... 232 While Professor Chin's
work focuses extensively on the loss of civil rights and public benefits that follow a
222. Gabriel Chin, The New Civil Death: Rethinking Punishment in the Era of Mass Conviction, 160 U. PA.
L. REv. 1789, 1790 (2012) (explaining that civil death "extinguished most civil rights of a person convicted of a
crime and largely put that person outside the law's protection.").
'223. Deborah Labelle, Bringing Human Rights Home to the World of Detention, 40 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv.
79, 85 (2008). See also Michael Pinard, Reflections and Perspectives on Reentry and Collateral Consequences,
100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1213, 1214 n.9 (2010) (explaining that civil death has been defined as "the
condition in which a convicted offender loses all political, civil, and legal rights") (quoting Alec C. Ewald, supra
note 210, at 1049 n.13).
224. Demleitner, supra note 129, at 154.
225. Id.
226. Chin, supra note 222, at 1790.
227. See Love, Starting Over, supra note 221, at 1707-08; Chin, supra note 222, at 1790.
228. Chin, supra note 222, at 1790.
229. See Margaret Colgate Love, Paying Their Debt to Society: Forgiveness, Redemption, and the Unform
Collateral Consequences of Conviction Act, 54 How. L.J. 753, 770 (2011) (explaining that "during the 1980s and
1990s new collateral sanctions and disqualifications were introduced into state and federal codes to augment and
reinforce what remained of the old [collateral consequences]"); see also Michael Pinard, Collateral Conse-
quences of Criminal Convictions: Confronting Issues of Race and Dignity, 85 N.YU. L. REv. 457, 461 (2010);
McGregor Smyth, From "Collateral" to "Integral": The Seismic Evolution of Padilla v. Kentucky and Its Impact
on Penalties Beyond Deportation, 54 How. L.J. 795, 796 (2011).
230. Love, Paying Their Debt to Society, supra note 229, at 771.
231. Chin, supra note 222, at 1790.
232. Id. at 1791.
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felony conviction, such as the right to vote, he also warns of the consequences of
conviction from less serious offenses.23 3 He explains that "[m]erely escaping
incarceration" does not insulate someone from the harsh collateral consequences
that follow conviction.234 Further, with respect to the right to contract with the
government, he argues that "for a person who must work for a living, loss of the
right to do business with the government-or work in any regulated industry-
could result in exclusion as complete as civil death under the nineteenth-century
statutes." 235 It is these collateral consequences of conviction that become the
11 236
"most important part" of the conviction.
There is no question that for health care executives "the most important part" of
conviction is exclusion from participation in federal health care programs. De-
barred health care executives cannot contract with the government or work for any
health care company that contracts with the government except in very limited
circumstances. The health care industry is one of the largest industries in the
United States. It accounts for approximately 18% of the United States' gross
domestic product. 2 3 7 Thus, excluded health care executives are unable to access
employment in a large segment of the economy. As Professor Demleitner has
argued, exclusion from "vast segments of the labor market. . . parallels the effect
of restrictions on the ex-offender's right to contract in the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries."238 As a result of the exclusion, the expertise that these health
care executives have gathered over the course of their careers becomes worthless.
In addition, health care executives have no way of demonstrating that they
have been rehabilitated and deserve reinstatement prior to the end of the exclusion
period. Even upon completion of the exclusion period, reinstatement is not
automatic. The excluded individual. must make a written request to the OIG for
reinstatement.2 3 9 The written request is not a mere formaility. Among other things,
the OIG must make a determination that the individual has not engaged in any
further actions like those that formed the basis of the exclusion and that the
233. Id. at 1806 (explaining that an individual who is facing twenty-five years in prison is probably not so
concerned about the loss of a license to practice in a particular industry, but for a person only facing probation, the
loss of license or other benefit can be "disastrous").
234. Id.
235. Id. at 1802.
236. Id. at 1806.
237. Louise Radnofsky, Steep Rise in Health Care Costs Projected, WALL ST. J., June 12, 2012, http://
online.wsj.com/article/SB 10001424052702303768104577462731719000346.html?KEYWORDS=medicare
(explaining that in 2010 the health care industry was 17.9% of gross domestic product and that by 2021 it will be
19.6% of gross domestic product).
238. Demleitner, supra note 129, at 156.
239. 42 C.F.R. § 1001.3001(a)(1) (2012). After receiving a written submission for reinstatement, the OIG will
request "specific information and authorization to obtain information from private health insurers, peer review
bodies, probation officers, professional associates, investigative agencies and such others as may be necessary to
determine whether reinstatement should be granted." 42 C.F.R. § 1001.3001(a)(3). If the requested information is
not provided to the OIG, the exclusion will be continued. 42 C.F.R. § 1001.3001(a)(4).
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individual will not do so in the future. 24 0 Even upon reinstatement, however, a
health care executive who has been debarred for an extended period of time may
find it difficult to obtain a position in the health care industry because their
expertise in the industry will be stale. In addition, any potential employer may be
hesitant to hire someone who has been excluded for such a long period of time.
There will either be a large gap or a complete change in industry that will be
readily apparent on a health care executive's resume. The subject of the exclusion
and the loss of professional capital over time is certain to come up in an interview.
Thus, even after the exclusionary period has ended, there are still significant
hurdles to reentering the health care field that an executive may be unable to clear.
As a result, a long period of exclusion is not just a harsh remedy; it is also the
modem day equivalent of "civil death" for health care executives.
B. The Government Should Prove Moral Blameworthiness Before Imposing a
Prolonged Period of Exclusion
1. A Prolonged Period of Exclusion is defacto Criminal Punishment
Executives who have committed the crime of being in charge when wrongdoing
occurred have little choice but to plead guilty to a misdemeanor misbranding
conviction based on the responsible corporate officer doctrine. The likelihood of
raising a successful defense at trial is low. That result is likely justified given the
potential health and safety dangers involved in these cases and the relatively minor
direct criminal consequences that flow from conviction. As explained above,
however, the collateral consequence of a prolonged period of exclusion is far more
devastating than the direct criminal consequences of conviction. To avoid prob-
lems of over deterrence, it is important that the sanction fits the crime. As Professor
Samuel Pillsbury has argued, "[t]o say that a punishment is deserved means more
than that an offender was responsible for a crime and should be punished; it also
means that the punishment matches the crime."2 4 1 If the OIG wants to impose a
period of exclusion greater than the base level of three years on a responsible
corporate officer, the OIG should be required to demonstrate that the officer is
240. 42 C.F.R. § 1001.3002(a)(1) (2012). The OIG must also determine that the exclusion period ended and
that there is no other basis for continuing the exclusion period. Id. In making its determination, the OIG will
consider the actions of the excluded individual before and after the notice of exclusion; whether all of the fines and
penalties due to the federal or state government have been paid; whether the individual complies with conditions
of participation; and whether the individual has submitted or caused claims to be submitted for payment from
federal health care programs. 42 C.F.R. § 1001.3002(b). If the OIG grants the request for reinstatement, it will
provide written notice to the excluded individual informing the individual of the reinstatement date. 42 C.F.R.
§ 1001.3003(a) (2012). In addition, OIG will inform CMS and all applicable federal and state health care
programs of the reinstatement. Id.
241. Samuel H. Pillsbury, Emotional Justice: Moralizing the Passions of Criminal Punishment, 74 CORNELL
L. REv. 655, 662 (1989).
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morally blameworthy for the misconduct. Otherwise, the debarment will be seen
as unjust.
One obvious objection to requiring a showing of moral blameworthiness before
imposing a period of exclusion exceeding the three year base period is that moral
blameworthiness is only considered necessary in criminal law. Indeed, exclusion
from federal health care programs is not considered to be a criminal penalty.
Exclusion has been characterized as a civil sanction.24 2 For some, that would be
the end of the inquiry. They would probably argue that because exclusion is a civil
sanction, the mens rea of the executive subject to exclusion is irrelevant. This is
especially true where, as here, there was no requirement of mens rea to obtain a
conviction. Perhaps that would be convincing if the executive was subject to
exclusion based on a conviction due to his own misconduct.
The civil sanction justification is not satisfying given the ramifications of ex-
clusion in the context where the government has convicted executives of misde-
meanor misbranding offenses based on the conduct of others. Indeed, as Margaret
Colgate Love has argued, "collateral consequences are increasingly understood
and experienced as criminal punishment, and never-ending punishment at that."24 3
Further, as explained by Professor Chin, "[w]hether or not any individual collateral
consequence is punishment, the overall susceptibility to collateral consequences is
punishment. This is the case at least when, as now, there is a vigorous, existing
network of collateral consequences."2 44
Thus, while exclusion may not technically be a criminal sanction, its imposition
is much more serious than the criminal penalties associated with a misdemeanor
misbranding conviction. If the government is going to impose "civil death" on an
executive then the exclusion should either be based on a conviction for the
executive's personal misconduct or the executive's awareness of or participation in
242. See, e.g., Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 103 (1997) (refusing to apply double jeopardy where a
banker was debarred and then criminally charged for the same conduct by explaining that the fact that debarment
authority was given to an administrative agency is "prima facie evidence that Congress intended to provide for a
civil sanction"). The Supreme Court explained that a civil sanction can be considered to be so punitive that it is
transformed into a criminal sanction, but that certain factors must exist before the court can make such a
determination. In particular, the court found the factors listed in Kennedy v. Mendoza Martinez, 372 U.S. 144,
168-69 (1963), to be persuasive. Those factors include:
(1) '[w]hether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint'; (2) 'whether it has
historically been regarded as a punishment'; (3) 'whether it comes into play only on a finding of
scienter'; (4) 'whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment-retribution
and deterrence'; (5) 'whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime'; (6) 'whether an
alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it'; and (7) 'whether it
appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned.'
Id.
243. Margaret Colgate Love, Essay, The Collateral Consequences of Padilla v. Kentucky: Is Forgiveness
Now Constitutionally Required?, 160 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 113, 114 (2011), available at http://www.penn
lawreview.com/essays/index.php?id=6 (as quoted in Chin, supra note 222, at 1806 n. 88).
244. Chin, supra note 222, at 1825-26.
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her subordinate's misconduct. Thus, a responsible corporate officer conviction
that is based on the actions of subordinates where the executive is unaware of
the misconduct should not form the basis for a prolonged period of exclusion. If
the government wants to exclude an executive who was convicted because she
was in charge at the time the misconduct within the company occurred, the
exclusion should be based on the executive's own moral blameworthiness. Thus,
there should be some showing that the executive acted negligently, recklessly,
knowingly, or purposefully in failing to recognize or remedy the misconduct of
subordinates.
2. Responsible Corporate Officers are not Always Morally Blameworthy for
the Actions of their Subordinates
Responsible corporate officers may be held criminally accountable for the
conduct of their subordinates but that does not mean that they are always morally
blameworthy for that misconduct. It is true that corporate officers in the health
care field voluntarily take on positions of responsibility in companies that may
potentially harm the health, safety, and welfare of the public. As a result, those
officers are "under a moral duty to perform that role carefully." 2 4 5 And, because
part of their role is to supervise subordinates, there may be situations where
corporate officers are morally blameworthy for their employees' misconduct. For
example, if the executive instructs or encourages the wrongdoing then she is
morally blameworthy for it. Nevertheless, a mere showing that the executive failed
to detect and correct or prevent the wrongdoing is not the same as saying that the
executive had a hand in the misconduct and is morally blameworthy for it. Moral
blameworthiness is not demonstrated simply by virtue of the officer's position in
the company. There needs to be some measure of culpability.
While there are many theories of moral responsibility, this Article accepts the
formulation by Professor Peter Arenella. Professor Arenella explains that in order
to assign moral blame to an individual's conduct, four conditions must exist:
"[a] (1) moral agent 2 4 6 must be implicated in (2) the breach of a moral norm
that (3) fairly obligates the agent's compliance under circumstances where that
(4) breach can be fairly attributed to the agent's conduct." 24 7 Generally, to find that
someone is morally blameworthy for causing harm the actor must "have some
245. Melvin Aaron Eisenberg, The Duty of Care of Corporate Directors and Officers, 51 U. Prrr. L. REv. 945,
945 (1990).
246. An individual may only be characterized as a moral agent if the individual has the ability to make
judgments concerning morality and to take actions that conform to those moral judgments. Peter Arenella,
Convicting the Morally Blameless: Reassessing the Relationship Between Legal and Moral Accountability,
39 UCLA L. REv. 1511, 1518 (1992) (explaining that individuals who do not have the potential for "moral
concern, judgment, and action" are undeserving of moral blame). Individuals who suffer from mental impair-
ments and young children are generally considered not to be moral agents. Id. at 1518-19.
247. Arenella, supra note 246, at 1518.
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form of knowledge, reason, and control of their actions before they can be fairly
blamed for what they have done." 2 4 8
Responsible corporate officers are certainly moral agents who have the capacity
to make moral judgments and take actions in conformity with those judgments.
While regulatory offenses such as misbranding may not be based on morality or
have moral content, they are morally wrongful in the sense that they are done
"in violation of a legal norm." 249 In addition, responsible corporate officers, as
members of the health care industry, are obligated to comply with the FDCA.
Therefore, the sole question with respect to responsible corporate officers is
whether the breach of a moral norm by a subordinate can be fairly attributed to the
officer's conduct.
As Professor Arenella explains, to satisfy the fair attribution principle, first
"there must be a voluntary act as well as causation between a defendant's act and
any resulting harm." 25 0 But, the responsible corporate officer doctrine lacks the
"traditional requirement[] to show a connection between the individual and the
,,251particular wrong. It does not conform to ordinary notions of causation and
blame. Professor Stanford Kadish explains that:
[w]e are responsible for ourselves and for what our actions cause in the
physical world, and we may cause things to happen unintentionally as well as
intentionally. However, what other people choose to do as a consequence of
what we have done is their action and not ours. Our actions do not cause what
they do in the sense that our actions cause events.252
Thus, causation and blame are tricky concepts in the context of the responsible
corporate officer doctrine. In many responsible corporate officer cases, the only
way to show causation is by omission. As Professor Brickey explains, "proof that
the officer had the responsibility and the power to prevent the violation and that he
failed to fulfill the duty to do so establishes the required causal link between the
officer and the violation."2 53 But, the notion that one person causes the actions of
another runs counter to our idea that each person is an autonomous actor. "We
regard a person's acts as the products of his choice, not as an inevitable, natural
result of a chain of events."25 4 While causation based on a factual connection (or
chain of events) between the officer and the violation may be justified in the
corporate context and thus sufficient for a misdemeanor conviction based on the
248. Id. at 1517.
249. Stuart Green, Why It's a Crime to Tear the Tag Off of a Mattress: Overcriminalization and the Moral
Content of Regulatory Offenses, 46 EMORY L.J. 1533, 1575 (1997).
250. Arenella, supra note 246, at 1523.
251. Petrin, supra note 21, at 299.
252. Stanford A. Kadish, Complicity, Cause and Blame: A Study in the Interpretation of Doctrine, 73 CAL.
L. REv. 323, 355 (1985).
253. Brickey, supra note 104, at 1363.
254. Kadish, supra note 252, at 333.
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responsible corporate officer doctrine, it is insufficient to show that an action is
fairly attributable to an executive.
Second, for an action to be fairly attributable there must be proof of mens rea
with respect to the individual's act or risked harm.2 55 With a misdemeanor
misbranding offense, however, there is no requirement of mens rea. Notwithstand-
ing the views of Professors Abrams and Aagaard, a finding that a responsible
corporate officer is guilty of a strict liability misdemeanor offense does not
establish culpability. As Professor Brickey makes clear, "while one might well
conclude that the [Park] Court's language. .. would support the proposition that
liability must be predicated upon a finding of minimal culpability or negligence,
within the context of the Park opinion the premise is unsound."2 5 6 There is no
explicit mens rea requirement in either the offense of conviction or in the
responsible corporate officer doctrine. Thus, while there may be some cases where
responsible corporate officers are culpable for the conduct of their subordinates, a
conviction alone does not demonstrate that culpability. Some additional showing
will be necessary to demonstrate that the wrongdoing can be fairly attributed to the
responsible corporate officer's conduct.
To prove that the actions of subordinates are fairly attributable to the responsible
corporate officer, there needs to be some showing that the executive in charge
intended for the wrongdoing to occur. As Professor Kadish explains, "[w]e become
accountable for the liability created by the actions of others ... only when we join
in and identify with those actions by intentionally helping or inducing them to do
those actions; in other words, by extending our wills to their action." 2 5 7 Without
some showing of intentionality, through negligence, recklessness, knowledge, or
purpose, there can be no finding that the actions of the subordinate are attributable
to the executive. Thus, in the ordinary case there would be no showing of moral
blameworthiness.
This is not to discount, of course, the fact that it would be difficult to prove the
moral blameworthiness of a responsible corporate officer. This is particularly true
if the executive is a high level official such as a Chief Executive Officer. It is
unlikely that the high level official's participation in the wrongdoing would be
documented. Further, the executive might become aware of misconduct but choose
not to intervene. The executive's discovery of the misconduct and subsequent
decision not to get involved may similarly go unmemorialized. In many cases, the
prosecutor would have to rely upon circumstantial evidence to prove culpability.
While both of these scenarios are realistic in a large corporation, the fact that these
situations could occur are not enough to relieve the prosecutor of the burden to
255. Arenella, supra note 246, at 1523.
256. Brickey, supra note 104, at 1364 (emphasis added) (examining the Court's language in Park where it
rejects the lower court's view that a finding of guilty requires a showing of "personal wrongdoing" demonstrated
by "gross negligence and inattention in discharging his corporate duties and obligations").
257. Kadish, supra note 252, at 355.
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prove that the officer is morally blameworthy before imposing the harsh remedy of
a long period of exclusion. While the public certainly has an interest in these
proceedings just like they do in criminal misdemeanor misbranding cases, the
public's interest is no longer paramount. In short, the justification for holding
responsible corporate officers accountable without a showing of moral blame-
worthiness does not hold up when the executive is facing a career-ending
exclusion.
3. Aggravating Factors Should be Based on the Moral Blameworthiness of the
Responsible Corporate Officer
If there are to be aggravating factors that increase the period of exclusion
beyond three years, they should be based on the moral blameworthiness of the
responsible corporate officer. They should not be based solely on the harm caused
by subordinates. For example, it may be appropriate to consider the corporate
hierarchy to determine whether the individuals who engaged in wrongdoing re-
ported directly to the responsible corporate officer or whether they were separated
by multiple levels of management. If the individuals who committed the miscon-
duct reported directly to the responsible corporate officer, then the executive's
failure to discover or prevent the wrongdoing is more egregious. In addition, it
would make sense to consider compliance measures that the executive may have
failed to execute. If the executive could have discovered the misconduct by simply
following compliance procedures, then the executive bares more blame for the
misconduct. Further, if there were reports of misconduct but the executive ignored
them, then the executive should be held accountable for the wrongdoing. The
bottom line is that the period of exclusion should be tied directly to the executive's
level of culpability for the acts of her subordinates.
V. CONCLUSION
The FDA should be commended for its efforts to raise the stakes in cases of
pharmaceutical fraud. Targeting executives who were in charge at the time that
misconduct occurred at the pharmaceutical company sends a strong message that
the FDA does not take violations of the drug marketing rules lightly. It holds the
executives accountable and gives them strong incentives to monitor their subordi-
nates. After obtaining a conviction, however, the FDA should not impose the
collateral consequence of exclusion for more than three years without first
demonstrating that the executive is morally blameworthy for the misconduct.
While exclusion may be a civil remedy, it is the most damaging remedy that an
executive can face. A long period of exclusion could amount to "civil death" that
takes away an executive's livelihood. Further, a long period of exclusion is
disproportionate to the harm caused by the executive's failure to prevent or detect
wrongdoing. Thus, the FDA should require a showing that the executive is morally
blameworthy for the misconduct of her subordinates before imposing a prolonged
period of exclusion.
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